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Building “Terrorism Studies” as an Interdisciplinary Space:
Addressing Recurring Issues in the Study of Terrorism
Mark Youngman
Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
Over the years, there have been many debates regarding the state of
research into terrorism and whether “terrorism studies” constitutes an
academic discipline in its own right. Such reﬂections, coupled with
the natural evolution of what is still a relatively new area of research,
have arguably led to signiﬁcant improvements in quality and rigour.
At the same time, the status of terrorism studies itself remains some-
what ambiguous: it is both discussed as a distinct ﬁeld and simulta-
neously evades criticism by pointing to the diﬃculties of deﬁning its
boundaries. There are undoubtedly a number of advantages to form-
ing a separate discipline, which would go some way to helping the
ﬁeld address some of the recurring problems that terrorism research
faces. However, this article ultimately argues that scholars are better
served by deliberately moving in the other direction and developing






To some degree, a distinct discipline devoted to the study of terrorism already exists. The
Economic and Social Research Council’s National Centre for Research Methods (UK)
identiﬁes several characteristics of academic disciplines: a particular object of research; an
accumulated body of specialised knowledge; theories and concepts for organising that
knowledge; speciﬁc research methods matching their requirements; and some form of
institutional manifestation.1 Terrorism studies clearly displays some of these character-
istics. There is a clear object of study and a body of knowledge dedicated to it, and there
are certainly distinct requirements that necessitate the development of speciﬁc research
methods. For other characteristics, the case is not necessarily more debatable than it is for
other ﬁelds that are universally recognised as disciplines. Theories and concepts for
organising knowledge have, for example, clearly been imported from other disciplines,
but so too have many of the theories and concepts that constitute political science. There
is, moreover, a community of academics who self-identify as terrorism scholars, and
several peer-reviewed journals that take terrorism as their primary point of enquiry. It
is largely on the question of institutionalisation (at least at the undergraduate level) that
terrorism studies falls short of the status of a recognised discipline. In the following
discussion, I will identify several advantages of taking this ﬁnal step and establishing
terrorism studies as a formal discipline. However, I ultimately seek to argue that some of
the recurring issues faced in the study of terrorism are best addressed not merely by
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resisting this temptation, but by actively encouraging movement in the other direction and
developing terrorism studies more explicitly as a space for interdisciplinary engagement.
The case for accommodating unique challenges and opportunities
Disciplines encourage cross-fertilisation of knowledge and historical awareness
Although some scholars have seen the development of terrorism studies as intrinsically linked
to the need to legitimise state agendas,2 there are less nefarious reasons why a distinct scholarly
community devoted to the phenomenon of terrorism has emerged. Primary among these is the
same reason that lies behind the emergence of most disciplines: it allows like-minded scholars
to come together, share ideas, and develop a multi-faceted understanding of the object of
study. Disciplines are better positioned to reproduce and build upon their own knowledge,
especially when institutionalisation encourages such knowledge to pass from one generation to
the next.3 A recurring criticism within terrorism studies is that new scholarship often displays a
lack of awareness of earlier research, particularly that conducted before 9/11. The establish-
ment of a dedicated discipline would, at least in theory, therefore allow for the development of
a more standardised and historically rooted foundation for the ﬁeld. Moreover, common
foundations make it easier for scholars to identify opportunities for the transferring of ideas
and approaches from the study of one geographic area or group to another, as well as to build
collaborative partnerships. This is not to argue that these are not possible without the
establishment of distinct disciplines, merely that such establishment improves the chances of
positive outcomes and can facilitate the development of necessary support structures.
In justifying the establishment of new journals devoted to the study of terrorism,
scholars have argued that terrorism is a phenomenon distinct from other forms of
political violence, in terms of the intentions and motivations of its perpetrators and its
capacity to inﬂuence political agendas.4 Many of the arguments used to justify the
establishment of these dedicated journals and research agendas support the establish-
ment of a separate discipline. Certainly, a precise focus oﬀers certain advantages: cross
case comparison is much easier when we focus on a narrow set of behaviours rather
than trying to capture a broad spectrum of activities that may be highly context-
speciﬁc. Datasets on terrorism are arguably able to be more precise because of this
narrow focus, achieving depth where other ﬁelds may prioritise breadth. Moreover, the
study of terrorism poses methodological challenges that may be distinct from those of
its current parent disciplines. To cite just one example, there are constraints on data
availability that exceed those faced in many types of political science research focused
on other phenomena. Realistically, we are not likely to ever be in a position to acquire
enough data to satisfy requirements of random sampling, controls, etc., nor are we
likely to acquire consistently high data across cases. Indeed, it is often hard enough to
ﬁnd single data points, much less triangulate information through genuinely indepen-
dent sources. Paying lip service to broader disciplinary standards that are unachievable
in practice creates a disconnect between research theory and practice and distracts
from the need to develop alternative approaches, such as a greater emphasis on
methodological rather than data triangulation.
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Universities need to oﬀer better protection for those researching terrorism
The establishment of a distinct discipline should, at least in theory, lead to signiﬁcant
improvements in institutional support mechanisms for terrorism researchers. One area
where this need is particularly pressing is the conduct of ﬁeldwork, particularly at the
doctoral level. Interviews with those directly engaged in political violence are sometimes
held up as something of a gold standard for primary data. In other words, there is a culture of
encouraging scholars to conduct research into a highly sensitive subject, often in areas
currently or recently aﬀected by conﬂict. At the same time, there is a chronic lack of
institutional support for such research. As an early career researcher (ECR) who has under-
taken research in this area, I want to express my opinion unambiguously: Many universities
are negligent in their responsibilities to their researchers. The default position appears to be
to leave researchers to source their own training (and structured and aﬀordable training
opportunities related to conducting interviews and mitigating risks are limited) and to learn
from trial and error, with everyone reinventing the wheel. Applied to high-risk research and
conﬂict zones, this approach will eventually lead to researchers being killed. Moreover, the
precarious career positions of ECRs means they are incentivised not to draw attention to
problematic practices at their own institutions for fear of damaging their career prospects.
Standard practices among government agencies, private businesses, and non-governmental
and media organisations show that they take their duty of care to employees far more
seriously than do some higher education establishments.
At the same time, institutions adopt risk-averse strategies that simply defer to, for
example, foreign ministry travel guidance (which does not necessarily correspond to
potential risk, which is why both approaches can be adopted simultaneously). They
therefore make much of the ﬁeld inaccessible anyway—with huge consequences for
what we can know about our subject of study. Some senior researchers get around this
by going to higher-risk areas as personal travel or by bypassing or being less than
transparent with their ethical review boards. This approach is neither available to nor
desirable for junior researchers, and it contributes to a disregard for researcher safety.
Those who take decisions on granting ethical approval often have no directly relevant
experience, and the application of standards relevant to other disciplines—such as signed
consent forms—can directly increase the risks faced by researchers.
Institutional support is lacking in other ways, too, and the costs of making ﬁeld
research the gold standard need to be acknowledged. Some of these are ﬁnancial: uni-
versities are, at the best of times, wealth-privileging institutions, and existing mechanisms
of support often do not fully cover the considerable costs of ﬁeldwork—particularly for
those who, for whatever reason, cannot fully uproot to their ﬁeld of study for lengthy
periods. Fieldwork, therefore, becomes impossible for poorer students. Others relate to the
welfare of researchers: ﬁeldwork places immense strain on the mental well-being of the
researcher, and it is harder to build up friend and other support networks when research-
ing clandestine violent groups in low-trust areas. In recent years, there appears to have
been considerable progress in recognising the importance of the mental health of
researchers. But the networks and mechanisms of support need to be in place before
researchers are encouraged to enter the ﬁeld. Institutionalisation could help address these
issues by bringing them into sharper focus and ensuring the development of directly
relevant research practices and support systems.
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Terrorism studies oﬀers unique opportunities for engagement beyond the academy
Terrorism attracts attention and directly shapes policy to a greater degree than is true of
many other social phenomena; indeed, its ability to do so is embedded in many deﬁnitions
of the term. As such, terrorism researchers enjoy clear opportunities for engagement with
both the media and policymaking communities. These opportunities, however, carry risks,
and the creation of a distinct discipline could be seen as a means of better mitigating them,
promoting best practice, and highlighting problematic behaviours. Consider, for example,
the question of engagement with the media. Having chosen a resonant form of violent
activity as the community’s foundation, such engagement is often highly event-driven.
Unfortunately, this often translates into a culture of commenting on all manifestations of
terrorism, regardless of context and the existence of an evidence base to support asser-
tions. In the absence of dedicated research, a person who has focused exclusively on
Northern Ireland is poorly placed to comment on the signiﬁcance of an IS-inspired attack
in New York, just as someone who has concentrated on the Middle East lacks the
knowledge base to oﬀer judgements about the insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus.
Of course, researchers can draw meaningful insights from their broader reading of the
literature. But if a person is appearing on TV in the aftermath of a major attack and
presented as a terrorism expert, then the audience can reasonably expect their expertise to
be directly relevant to that speciﬁc incident. If their comments are not related to the
research they have conducted, it is hard to see how this could be the case—and it
encourages the spread of unsubstantiated myths.
It may be objected that other disciplines face the same problem of academics presuming
that the title of Dr or Professor entitles them to comment on subjects that have nothing to
do with their expertise. This is true, but we should not be blind to the fact that terrorism
studies has a persistent and not always undeserved reputational problem. The media and
political attention that accompanies terrorism has always made it an attractive target for
charlatans and self-appointed experts. Moreover, some think tanks and individuals
attempt to borrow the authority of academia, be it through the use of academic titles,
the employment or partnership with those with academic qualiﬁcations and reputations,
or co-location with academic institutions. At the same time, they often produce work that
is not methodologically rigorous; has not been through peer review; does not demonstrate
a detailed understanding of the literature; does not contribute original data; and/or does
not conform to the relevant ethical standards. Consequently, poor practices by the few
carry greater reputational risks for the many than may be the case elsewhere.
Institutionalisation may help to encourage the development of stronger safeguards against
poor quality research—for example, through more judicious citation practices or the
creation of guidelines for media engagement—and make it easier for outsiders to identify
genuine expertise.
As regards policy engagement, this remains highly controversial, even within the
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) community. Jackson, for example, claims,
Policymakers are, for the most part, uninterested in evidence-based policy, or in the rigorous
evaluation of counterterrorism policy, or in listening to reasonable, evidence-based sugges-
tions about how to more eﬀectively, and more ethically, respond to acts of terrorism.5
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Toros, by contrast, justiﬁes dialogue with policymakers on the same grounds as dialogue
with violent political actors, namely “all agents are capable of change and
transformation.”6 The question of how one can inform policy and practice without
becoming complicit in it is a serious ethical dilemma in the study of political violence,
and one to which there are no simple answers. At the very least, academics can risk
legitimising state practices. There also needs to be an acknowledgement that “impact” is
not always positive:7 if research ﬁndings, for example, were to demonstrate that killing the
leaders of groups engaged in terrorism is more eﬀective in reducing violence than arrest-
ing them, this has a logical consequence when translated into practice, regardless of the
rigour and validity of the ﬁndings.
In my experience, however, Jackson’s characterisation of policymakers is a sweeping
generalisation. Many of the people working on these issues appear to be sincerely trying to
do their best, even if they—like the rest of us—often do not succeed and produce results
diametrically opposed to those intended. In reaching out for academic expertise, it is not
the case that they are all looking for a cloak of legitimacy to justify their decisions, even if
we need to be aware that some are doing precisely that. Instead, many are genuinely
seeking to better understand and address the underlying problems. We cannot criticise
state policies for being ill-informed and at the same time turn away those who seek to
make them better informed. I would also suggest that condemning your interlocutor as
implicated in a “monstrous global machine” is not a constructive starting point for debate.
What matters in such engagement is that it is conducted in good faith and undertaken by
researchers with adequate consideration of the merits and disadvantages. The decision
about whether to engage may therefore vary not only by state, but also by institution—and
researchers need to be aware of how organisational cultures may impact the subject-
matter expertise within them and the possible outcomes of such engagement. Researchers
need to move beyond engagement as a general abstraction, and instead take into account
the practicalities and implications of engaging with speciﬁc partners.
At the same time, we need to maintain our autonomy in interactions, and be conscious
of how policy-driven research can prejudice the questions that are asked8—and this is an
area where a stronger institutional presence could help. At present, too many scholars are
willing to adopt the voice of the state as their own. The use of the pronoun “we” has no
place in discussing state policies and reactions: it signiﬁes an over-identiﬁcation with one
of the subjects of study. Moreover, we need to critically analyse information produced by
all states. If the U.S. government issues a statement on an issue, or designates an actor in a
certain way, this does not constitute evidence that the underlying claim is true or the
designation accurate, any more than if it came from the Russian state. There may be valid
intelligence behind a claim, but if we cannot see the evidence, we should not take it as a
given. Instead, we should critically assess such information as we have and acknowledge
its limitations. To take information from the state on faith and use it to support
recommendations given to the state is poor analytic practice. At the same time, there
are no simple answers to the question of autonomy: there is simply no escaping the fact
that most research funding comes, in one way or another, from the state. Establishing a
distinct discipline, however, could lead to greater ﬁnancial support from institutions, and
thus reduce (although certainly not eliminate) the reliance on direct funding for projects.
This, in turn, would ensure that more controversial topics whose ﬁndings may not be
beneﬁcial to the state can still be researched.
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 5
Although it does not directly impinge on the question of whether to establish a
discipline, there is a broader philosophical tension that should be acknowledged in
considering engagement with speciﬁc actors: that between activist and observer. Jackson
has called for scholars to side with “oppressed” groups and adopt a “new aspirational gold
standard” based on “how useful our research was to ongoing struggles for social justice.”9
Others propose speciﬁc policy recommendations in order to eﬀect change on the part of
the state. In both cases, researchers seek to actively shape the processes they are studying.
At the same time, this carries with it the dangers of partisanship and politicising research.
CTS, for example, has too often served as a highly politicised means for criticising
Western policy and practices. A third category of researchers see themselves more as
neutral observers, and consequently identify more with Schmid and Jongman’s famous
assertion that we should not confuse the roles of ﬁreﬁghter and student of combustion.10
There are valid concerns over whether aligning with counterterrorism practitioners
jeopardises our ability to understand those they are seeking, in one way or another, to
eliminate. The tensions between these positions may be unresolvable. My own position on
this question has shifted from the latter towards a more activist position: Ultimately, I
struggle to see the merits of an academy that talks only to itself and does not try to eﬀect
positive change in some way (not necessarily to the beneﬁt of the state). One of the
advantages enjoyed by terrorism as a ﬁeld is that some of the opportunities for achieving
such change are more evident than might be the case for other disciplines. However,
whatever position one adopts, one needs to be explicit about it and its potential con-
sequences, and this is as true for those advocating for the state as for its opponents.
The case against recurring issues in the study of “terrorism”
The very name of the ﬁeld is misleading
A major challenge in assessing the state of research into “terrorism” lies in determining
what qualiﬁes as such. It is a challenge of deﬁnition—not of the term itself, debates around
which manage to be simultaneously important and tedious—but of the boundaries of the
“ﬁeld.” Contributors come from a range of disciplines, and many do not self-identify as
being engaged in the study of “terrorism”—not least because of the ﬁeld’s aforementioned
reputational problems. This arguably makes the blurring of boundaries inevitable. Equally
signiﬁcant, however, is one of the reasons why this is so: the primary focus of much
“terrorism” research—even by those who would self-identify as terrorism scholars or
publish in core terrorism journals—is not terrorism at all. Insurgency, for example, is at
least as signiﬁcant an activity as terrorism for many of the groups studied. Despite the lack
of consensus over the term, most rigorous deﬁnitions of terrorism incorporate a require-
ment that it include political violence targeting civilians. Yet there are very few groups that
engage exclusively, or even predominantly, in this type of activity. To demonstrate this,
one need look no further than the focal point of many contemporary debates: the Syrian
conﬂict. The Islamic State, for example, targets civilians, but it also ﬁghts Syrian govern-
ment forces and other rebel groups, engages in various forms of economic activity, and
undertakes governance functions. Some of the groups seeking to overthrow the Syrian
government arguably do not target civilians at all. The ﬁeld of “terrorism studies” is thus
mislabelled from the outset.
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Does this matter, given that most analyses would nevertheless acknowledge these
activities? It is no accident that several of the dedicated “terrorism” journals nod in the
direction of other activities in their titles: “conﬂict,” “political violence,” “political aggres-
sion,” and so forth. However, I would argue that viewing them through the lens of
terrorism prejudices debate in important ways—and thus raises the question of what we
would call the discipline. Consider, for example, the question of legitimacy. The legitimacy
of political violence is not binary; instead, it operates along a spectrum. The designation of
an act as illegal may constitute a state’s or a society’s verdict on its legitimacy, but even the
state diﬀerentiates between illegal actions. Terrorism “refers to cases that have crossed a
moral line within the category of nonstate political violence, [implying] the possibility (a
contrario) that nonstate political violence might also take forms that are not wrongful.”11
Attacks on civilians occupy a diﬀerent position on the spectrum than, for example, attacks
on security services engaged in predatory practices—in the eyes of the perpetrators, of the
communities aﬀected by their actions, and often even of their state opponents. It is
precisely for this reason that the label “terrorism” is able to serve a delegitimising function.
By taking an action from the far end of the legitimacy spectrum as a starting point, we
hinder our own ability to accurately understand such important questions as motivation
and societal reactions.
There are at least two potential objections to this point. First, there are already many
ﬁelds that don’t adopt the terrorism lens in considering violent political actors. This is
perfectly true, but does little to resolve the problem for those who do. Instead, it creates an
artiﬁcial and unhelpful barrier between scholars studying the same phenomenon—a
barrier that would only become greater with the establishment of a distinct discipline.
Amongst the work produced by those who adopt the terrorism perspective, there is much
of value to those who don’t, and vice versa. Second, those who adopt a Critical Terrorism
Studies (CTS) perspective would argue that this prejudicing of the debate is not accidental.
CTS from the outset positioned itself as seeking “to challenge dominant knowledge and
understandings of terrorism […and as being] sensitive to the politics of labelling in the
terrorism ﬁeld.” The positive and negative consequences of CTS’s emergence will be
addressed shortly. The CTS perspective, however, does nothing to address the problems
stemming from the mislabelling of the ﬁeld. It remains focused on a single type of political
violence at the far end of the legitimacy spectrum; rather than expanding the behaviours
under consideration, it seeks to expand the categories of actors that can be accused of
undertaking the original subset. How we frame a debate aﬀects the questions that we ask
and the research agendas that we set, and a narrow “terrorism” framing discourages
researchers from asking questions that may be pertinent to understanding other forms
of political violence, but not terrorism. It is not that terrorism is not an important subset
of political violence, but that it is only a subset—and we must look beyond if we are to
understand it. Taking the actor, rather than the action, as the starting point for analysis
opens up avenues for better understanding both.12
Many of the terms used to discuss political violence are problematic
Directly related to the mislabelling of the ﬁeld, many of the terms used to discuss political
violence are misleading or inappropriate. Labelling an actor as a “terrorist” reproduces
many of the problems outlined above, obscuring the range of other equally signiﬁcant
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activities they may be involved in. For those who seek to deﬁne terrorism in neutral rather
than pejorative terms and according to clearly deﬁned criteria, the term may serve as
convenient shorthand. Such a use, however, contributes little by way of insight, any more
than the repeated use of the term “criminal” would. At the same time, such scholars
cannot ignore the pejorative connotations associated with the label “terrorist” in public
discourse. Ultimately, I ﬁnd it hard to refute Stampnitzky’s argument that “those who
would address terrorism as a rational object, subject to scientiﬁc analysis and manipula-
tion, produce a discourse that they are unable to control.”13 If we want to use a term that
has moved beyond the academy into the public discourse, we need to reconcile ourselves
to the baggage that comes with it—and its consequences—rather than trying to deﬁne that
baggage out of existence.
Scholars engaged in the study of all forms of political violence also need to continually
remind themselves and be critical of the dehumanizing way in which such violence is
often discussed. I have seen the North Caucasus described as “an ideal laboratory to study
insurgent behavior.”14 Some people talk of “battleﬁelds” and “battleﬁeld losses.”15 And it is
all too easy—and I do not exclude myself from this criticism—to slip into the euphemistic
language of conﬂict, where insurgencies are “decapitated” and “collateral damage” is
inﬂicted. Lost behind this language are the real human lives that are aﬀected. The people
of the North Caucasus, or any other area aﬀected by conﬂict, are not rats in an experi-
ment. The “battleﬁeld” in question is, more often than not—particularly given that much
substate conﬂict occurs in urban areas—a place where people live.
The perpetrators of political violence are people too. When stated directly, few serious
scholars are likely to take issue with this assertion. Yet adequate recognition of the fact
is one of several areas where problems existing across disciplines—of complex beha-
viours reduced to overly simplistic or monocausal explanations, or of people reduced to
variables—become exacerbated in terrorism studies. For example, Hegghammer justiﬁed
a recent edited volume on jihadist culture by arguing: “The cultural practices of rebel
groups pose a social scientiﬁc puzzle in that they defy expectations of utility-maximizing
behavior… . We should expect them to spend all their time honing their bomb-making
skills, raising funds, or studying the enemy’s weaknesses.”16 Yet why should we expect
this? There is no ﬁeld of human activity where we would expect actors to devote all of
their waking hours to work-related activities. We do not (or should not) expect it of
doctors, soldiers, or politicians—all of whom may be involved in making life-deﬁning
decisions.
In reality, this “puzzle” is an illustration of one of the limitations of the rational actor
model, and is not peculiar to the study of terrorism. Yet the impact is greater in a research
area where there is typically considerable distance between researcher and research
subject; where the “utility-maximizing” behaviour is fundamentally threatening; where
there is sometimes a pressure to oﬀer moral condemnation and demonstrate that under-
standing is not the same as condoning; and where other actors may be deliberately seeking
to dehumanize their opponents to justify certain behaviours. Wilhelmsen’s case study of
the Chechen conﬂict shows how linguistic representations can legitimize real-world
policies and feed into real-world practices.17 Again, this is an area where scholars need
to be aware of the broader public discourses they may, however unwillingly, be contribut-
ing to. Bringing the terrorism literature into closer dialogue with, for example, that on
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civil wars—where there appears to be a greater emphasis on the victims and social
consequences of violence—could help partially mitigate this issue.
Sometimes, however, the solution is not so simple as ﬁnding other words. Take
“terrorism,” for example. Even if one agrees with Stampnitzky about the impossibility of
controlling the discourse around the term, it is hard to avoid it entirely. This is because it
is precisely this term that signals to audiences interested in the range of subjects covered
by “terrorism studies” that one is talking about a topic of interest to them. The same is
true of the term “foreign ﬁghters.” It is an imperfect term because it obscures the degrees
of foreignness that can apply to a person and the various forms of non-combat activities
that they can engage in. At the same time, if one starts oﬀ by talking about “transnational
activists,” there is a good chance that audiences (particularly non-academic ones) won’t
know that this also covers the foreign ﬁghters they are interested in. If we choose to
abandon terms entirely, we also sacriﬁce to a certain degree our ability to engage with
those outside the academy.
Terrorism studies remains an echo chamber
Although the self-representation of academia is largely one of an entirely meritocratic
enterprise, it is probably the case for all disciplines that structural factors and networks
play an equally important role as the quality of ideas in shaping the disciplinary space for
research. The smaller the ﬁeld, however, the greater the role of inﬂuential networks.
Terrorism studies, in so far as it exists as a discrete community, is both small and new
relative to other disciplines, and there have historically been a large number of one-time
contributors.18 As such, inﬂuential academic and policy networks—especially those with
long-standing links or which are close to seats of power—have a particularly outsized
impact. Having personal ties to an inﬂuential node within the “terrorism studies” or CTS
networks has a major inﬂuence on the impact a person’s work has.
It also seems reasonable to assume that a reluctance to oﬀend inﬂuential nodes has
resulted in a reduced willingness to critically engage with work produced by them. It is naive
or dishonest to expect entrants to a ﬁeld to be unaware of the risks of oﬀending those who
act as institutional gatekeepers or editorial board members—and who are therefore in a
position to inﬂuence not only speciﬁc career trajectories, but even the possibility of having a
career in the ﬁrst place. Consequently, some work with signiﬁcant methodological short-
comings has achieved the status of seminality within the ﬁeld. The perpetual insecurity of
the ECR position has a particularly corrosive eﬀect in smaller disciplines. Here, I may be
challenged to provide an example—for which I cite this text itself. As an ECR with an
insecure position, I have made a conscious calculation that the potential costs of identifying
speciﬁc individuals here outweigh any negligible beneﬁts I can imagine (in addition to
requiring a signiﬁcant detour for such criticisms to be fair). This is not cowardice, but
rational calculation as to which battles are worth ﬁghting. Self-censorship isn’t something
that just happens somewhere else—it is something we all practice in certain circumstances.
It is important to acknowledge, however, that it is not simply a matter of blaming
those who happen to be members of inﬂuential networks. In a competitive environ-
ment, only the exceptionally privileged can aﬀord not to exploit any advantage they
may have, and we can never be aware of the full extent of the privileges that we do
enjoy. We all wish to believe that we achieve on our own merits. We can only cite work
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we are familiar with—and we are more likely to be aware of work produced by those
with whom we have a personal relationship. And the nature of privilege is such that it
does not have to be exercised for those who do not hold it to be aware of it. Even a
conscious eﬀort at objectivity and neutrality changes behaviours by virtue of that
consciousness. Yet just because a problem is intractable does not make it less of a
problem.
Arguably, this is one area where the splitting of the ﬁeld into “orthodox” and CTS
strands is particularly regrettable, and where the erection of further disciplinary bound-
aries would only exacerbate the situation. CTS’s emergence stimulated important debates
about the state of existing research,19 and its stated goal of encouraging greater reﬂexivity
from the ﬁeld was (and remains) a commendable one. Among its contributions, it has
generated valuable insights into how knowledge is constructed and how the media shapes
perceptions, debates, and practices. For example, Campana’s and Wilhelmsen’s works help
us better understand the content and consequences of counterterrorism framing and
securitisation.20 Gunning’s critical reﬂections on ideology have problematized several
issues and demonstrated the need for contextualised, sophisticated approaches.21
Stampnitzky’s study of the construction of knowledge and expertise in terrorism studies
is essential reading for anyone concerned with the state of the ﬁeld.22 Yet the creation of
CTS has largely resulted in the creation of a separate “echo chamber,” with a recent review
of 10 years of its existence acknowledging there has been “too little subsequent dialogue”
between “critical” and “orthodox” scholars.23 Thus an opportunity to create alternative
networks of inﬂuence and provide balance in a diverse intellectual ecosystem has been
lost. However contentious the distinction may be in reality, the fracturing of the ﬁeld into
rival camps has arguably worked to its overall impoverishment.
Here, it is also worthwhile reﬂecting more broadly on the problem of insularity, of
communities that talk largely to themselves. Again, this is a problem that is exacerbated by
the erection of disciplinary boundaries. Academia needs to do a much better job of
communicating its ﬁndings beyond the academy and helping those who are interested
in rigorous, evidence-based research to access ﬁndings. Universities are public institutions,
and much of their funding comes, in one way or another, from taxpayers. Yet, for the
most part, neither government employees nor members of the public can access the
research they fund. Indeed, publications are sometimes diﬃcult to access even for those
within academia. Researchers are eﬀectively punished for making their material accessible,
in that publication with prohibitively expensive leading journals and academic publishers
improves career prospects. It may be objected that these are broader problems, rather than
discipline speciﬁc. This is true, but change will only occur when a groundswell is achieved
within disciplines and inﬂuential ﬁgures who have already achieved secure positions use
their inﬂuence to eﬀect change. If you are a major name within your ﬁeld, if you hold
editorial positions, if you win major grants for your institution, then you occupy a
position of privilege that can be used to achieve such change. It may be more than likely
that you will never succeed, but that does not free you from the obligation to try. And one
of the reasons why charlatans and low-quality think tanks are able to inﬂuence public
debates about terrorism to the degree that they do is that this is often the only work that
people can ﬁnd and access.
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Too many methodologies are insuﬃciently sophisticated
Methodologically, terrorism studies has a long way to go. One of its strengths is that it
draws on insights from a range of established disciplines, including political science,
criminology, psychology, language-based area studies, history, and sociology. This, how-
ever, is also one of its weaknesses, because it has led to a tendency to borrow rather than
critically engage. Too often, researchers display only a cursory knowledge of the rich
literatures relevant to a given theory, and therefore present ﬁndings as novel that are far
from it. Much of the terrorism studies literature to employ Social Network Analysis
(SNA), for example, will readily cite Sageman but make very little reference to the rich
SNA debates in sociology, including that of direct relevance to political violence—such as
the work of Crossley and Edwards at the University of Manchester.24 Instead, terrorism
studies can be overly self-referential, citing the same small body of literature over and over
again and exacerbating the aforementioned problems of an echo chamber.
Such methodological shortcomings have been recognised by a number of prominent
scholars. In 2004, Silke criticised terrorism studies for existing “on a diet of fast-food
research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious,” with a preference for
methodologies that are not overly time-consuming.25 Schuurman’s update indicates sig-
niﬁcant progress in the use of primary source material26—although even primary data,
such as an overreliance on social media platforms, can be nutritionally dubious. At the
same time, the problem is not limited to the use of such sources or even methodological
transparency: it is also about sophistication and how methodologies are applied and
adapted to suit the subject of study. As someone who studies ideology, I have lost count
of the number of times people have gone into battle against the straw man of “it’s not all
about ideology.” This is true: ideology is insuﬃcient as a sole explanation, and in many
cases, it may not be the primary explanation. But this does not mean that ideology does
not play a role. Too often, studies of terrorism take as their starting or ﬁnishing points
overly simplistic or monocausal explanations, where other disciplines have developed
much more sophisticated approaches. Debating the state of the ﬁeld a decade after
Silke’s assessment, Taylor acknowledged that “we do seem to have absorbed too often
an ethos of research and investigation that doesn’t value methodology to the extent that
other more empirical disciplines might.”27 Yet, while some may ﬁnd methodological issues
uninspiring, they are the foundation for the theoretical houses we seek to build.
One area where problems of data and methodology are particularly evident is that of
ﬁeld research. As already mentioned, interviewees with those directly engaged in political
violence are sometimes held up as something of a gold standard for primary data. At the
same time, Horgan has noted that many researchers who conduct such interviews “appear
reluctant to share information on the process of that enquiry (i.e. how to get access), the
subsequent methodological issues underpinning their enquiries (i.e. what kind of inter-
viewing etc.) as well as the immediate outcomes.”28 Field data is of limited value without
such information. Furthermore, there has been relatively little reﬂection—beyond the
edited volume to which Horgan was contributing—on the methodological diﬀerences in
conducting such research compared to that on non-violent movements and the implica-
tions they have for ﬁndings. Whereas scholars of non-violent social movements might, for
example, embed themselves in movements, this is not viable (practically and legally) for
the study of violent illegal groups. This, in turn, impacts the quality of available data and
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the conclusions that can be drawn. This is not to argue against ﬁeld research, because this
helps to contextualise the work—which is about more than a superﬁcial recognition of the
importance of context and requires knowledge of languages and cultures, particularly
when looking beyond a Western context. I would entirely agree with Dolnik that ﬁeld
research is about more than data collection and can play an important role in educating
the researcher.29 Instead, it is to argue that we should be clear on why we are conducting
ﬁeld research, and view interview data as a means, rather than an end—and as only one
possible means of reducing the distance between the researcher and their subject.
Furthermore, we should forefront methodological considerations, and do more to chal-
lenge the prevailing tendency to be seduced by conclusions without concern for how they
are reached. Increased engagement with more methodologically robust disciplines oﬀers
one way of doing this.
Conclusion: developing “terrorism studies” as an interdisciplinary space
The aim of the preceding discussion has not been to set up a straw man, where the move
to establish an independent discipline is seen as something imminent. To the best of my
knowledge, it is not. However, a distinct community of scholars devoted to the study of
terrorism already exists, and it faces a number of recurring problems. The question of
whether to formalise terrorism studies as a discipline serves as a useful means of shedding
light on these problems and developing constructive solutions to them. The preceding
discussion is by no means comprehensive: there are many other issues that I have not
addressed, and my perspective as an ECR may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from that of a more
established scholar. Moreover, many of these issues are not unique to the topic; rather,
they are exacerbated by its particularities and the broader context in which research
occurs. Many of them have been recognised at various points by existing scholars—and
yet there is value in periodically revisiting challenges, both to be clear that the issues have
yet to be resolved and to stimulate debates about ways of doing so. Often, as in the titles of
the dedicated journals, such recognition is implicit or buried deep in texts, whereas it
needs to be made more prominent if it is to be properly addressed. In other words, for all
the progress that has been made in improving the ﬁeld, much remains to be done.
Establishing a discipline of terrorism studies would arguably help address some of the
issues that the ﬁeld faces. The case is strongest in regards to the provision of institutional
support and facilitating the transfer of knowledge. If the issues of ﬁeldwork support are to
be properly addressed across institutions, this would require some form of organisational
restructuring: ad hoc, institution-speciﬁc changes are unlikely to achieve much. One way
in which the problem of ethical review could be addressed, for example, is through the
establishment of a formalised, cross-institutional advisory mechanism that ethics commit-
tees can consult in considering ethical approval. The stronger intra-institutional presence
aﬀorded by the establishment of a discipline could potentially make that easier to support.
A discipline would also presumably be much better placed to agree on what the founda-
tions of its knowledge are. This would help address the all-too-frequent problem of a lack
of historical awareness and reduce the ability of newcomers with limited awareness of
previous research to guide debates.
In other regards, however, it is hard to argue that the establishment of a discipline
would achieve what it should in theory. Stampnitzky, for example, points to academics’
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lack of “power to regulate who is treated as an expert in the wider world” as a limitation
on their ability to control and rationalise terrorism.30 Yet it is hard to see where such a
power would come from—and how it would not simply exacerbate other problems, such
as that of self-serving, closed intellectual elites who deny a voice to those less privileged.
Moreover, as one of the reviewers of this paper has pointed out, the status of a discipline
has done little to guard against fraud and low quality work elsewhere. Nor does peer
review guarantee rigour: although its impact is positive when it works as intended, a lack
of transparency to the system means that it is all too easily gamed, such as through the
process of recommending one’s own reviewers or the diﬃculty of achieving true anon-
ymity. The erection of disciplinary boundaries will only exacerbate the problems of an
overly self-referential community. For many of the issues facing the study of terrorism, if
the establishment of a discipline does not make the situation worse, it is diﬃcult to see
how it would make it better.
Developing terrorism studies as a space for interdisciplinary engagement, by contrast,
would allow us to move some of the issues from the margins to the forefront of our
thinking. Some of the most important ﬁndings about political violence come from those
who do not identify as terrorism scholars. Della Porta’s work has advanced our under-
standing of the role of social networks and the importance of situating violence within
broader social contexts.31 Sanín and Wood have made a signiﬁcant theoretical contribu-
tion to the role of ideology in insurgencies.32 Staniland has contributed a detailed study
of the role of pre-conﬂict networks in insurgent organizations.33 There are many reasons
why these scholars would not identify themselves as “terrorism” scholars. As someone
who belongs to the “ﬁeld” of terrorism studies almost by default—by virtue of the
subject I study and being a poor ﬁt with the international relations ﬁeld I am depart-
mentally situated within—I would suggest two potential factors. One is that some of the
recurring issues and the broader debates around terrorism make such an association
unattractive. Another is a desire to avoid limiting one’s contribution to the study of
terrorism and instead contribute to the core disciplines from which theoretical frame-
works originate.
Rather than erecting artiﬁcial barriers by creating separate echo chambers, we should
look to build bridges to those working elsewhere. First and foremost, this is about a shift
in philosophy. It requires not merely borrowing from diﬀerent disciplines, but critically
engaging with them, and moving beyond the big names in a ﬁeld to immerse ourselves
in their debates. By engaging more reviewers from those ﬁelds, it may become easier to
identify the poor interdisciplinary practice and weak methodologies that sometimes slip
through the net. At the same time, scholars of terrorism should be conﬁdent of the
contribution we can make to those disciplines. The study of social movements, for
example, has historically been heavily biased towards progressive, left-wing groups in
the West.34 Scholars like Marsden and Holbrook not only demonstrate an in-depth
understanding of the relevant social movement literature, but they use them to not only
expand our understandings of political violence, but to develop and expand social
movement theory.35 Where we are unable to make a contribution to the literatures
that we borrow from, it may be that our conclusions are not quite as original as we
would like to think.
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